PRC’s Gray Zone Activities

The PRC now routinely operates within a spectrum of Gray Zone activities that it executes in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.  The Rand Corporation recently published a report titled: “Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations”.  This report is focused on China’s campaign of coercive activities that lie in the “operational space between peace and war”.  More and more, we are seeing China exert control in the region while largely avoiding a conventional response from the international community.  This is because China has mastered the art of employing gray zone operations which skirt the boundaries of kinetic actions.

The report also goes into recommended courses of actions for DoD, Joint Staff and the US Indo-Pacific Command to take in response to this difficult and hostile region of the Pacific.  I’ll discuss the methods employed; the organizations involved as well as provide some historical context to better understand the evolving threats from the PRC.

Most discussions concerning the PRC lately involve their aspirations of reclaiming Taiwan but most dangerous is their campaign in the South China Sea, where they are imposing their will in the Exclusive Economic Zones of other nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam.  They impose their will through various means including maritime aggression, cyber operations, violation of territorial airspace, economic coercion and online propaganda.  China uses a multi-functional approach to impose their will which includes the use of law enforcement and civilian militia organizations.  The China Coast Guard and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia are a couple of the non-traditional organizations that the PRC uses to coerce other nations operating in the South China Sea.  The PAFMM is particularly useful to the PRC for gray zone activities because they can be used in a military like manner under the guise of a civilian appearance and operating charter.  Under the guise of law enforcement, the China Coast Guard harasses and even rams vessels of other nations that it determines are in violation of its territorial waters.  The PLA Navy is not as involved in gray zone operations as the China Coast Guard and the PAFMM are but they are often positioned nearby for intimidation and back up if a situation escalates.  The three maritime forces work together to carry out the will of PRC regional objectives.  In the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone, these forces worked together to openly harass a Malaysian oil exploration vessel which escalated into an incident known as the West Capella Incident.  The CCG and PAFMM disengaged from the oil tanker just before the incident escalated into something more serious, this was due in part to the arrival of US vessels which apparently prompted a withdrawal-- this is the art of gray zone operations, that China has apparently mastered. 

The authors discuss the importance of US presence through Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) which are currently insufficient to counter the current state of PRC Gray Zone Operations. The current schedule of overwatch of CCG and PAFMM vessels by US Warships is not deterring any of the PRCs maritime aggression.  The authors recommend expanding the FONOPs program to include USCG presence operations to Southeast Asia, they are currently operating in Oceana.  Named the USCG Shiprider program, it is proposed that the USCG accompany Philippine Coast Guard vessels on patrols and play an active role in tactical aids.  An important aspect of the increased presence is the absence of adequate media coverage, especially since the PRC values propaganda and public opinion, stronger media coverage of an expanded US presence in the South China Sea would likely damage the perception that China is looking to convey and serve as a powerful tool to counter their gray zone operations. 

Another important recommendation is to expand support to regional allies and partners in order to build capacity.  Principal focus should be on improving their security posture by enabling regional coast guards.  This can be done through the use of Mobile Training Teams and the expedited development of a new US Coast Guard training facility in the Philippines.  Given the limited budget of the USCG, the DoD would need to reassess programs that support regional militaries at the MACRO level.  

Finally, the report discusses a proposed use of Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) by the US and its allies and partners to deter PRC from conducting gray zone operations. 

NLWs are systems and capabilities that can be used in all phases of conflict to stop, deter, delay, or temporarily incapacitate targeted personnel and materiel by producing predictable, immediate effects that are intended to be reversible and minimize unnecessary destruction and loss of life. 

This broad definition applies across several technologies and capabilities and would be a perfectly suited counter to China’s gray zone operations.  NLWs have already been employed by NATO and the US in situations where presence is insufficient for deterrence, but lethal action is unwarranted.  Examples of NLWs include: acoustic systems that create irritating sounds, laser dazzlers that may impair vision temporarily, millimeter wave systems – such as an active denial system that may create temporary discomfort through concentrated and directed heat, microwave beams that can incapacitate vehicles or vessels and finally, occlusion technologies which can degrade the performance of a marine vessel’s propeller.  

These recommendations, if implemented holistically will likely dissuade escalation but they may not change the course of the PRCs goals and objectives for regional dominance.  The PRC’s primary goal is the assertion of its perceived territorial claims.  It’s not just Taiwan either, the PRC has been assertive in the protection of territorial claims since 1949 when it was founded.  Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has disputed the sovereignty of land and water stretching from the Himalayas to the South China Sea.  Their claims also expand to the East China Sea where they dispute the Senkaku Islands with Japan.  They firmly believe that they have the right to build any necessary defense capabilities required to ensure that their sovereignty is protected in all of these waters.  In 2019, China published a defense white paper that stated it’s fundamental goal as “resolutely safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security and development interests”.  China has identified  gray zone operations as a key strategy for the enforcement of territorial claims, which it actually refers to as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).  It uses MOOTW to advance the nation’s political, economic, social and strategic objectives.  So, my point is, while good to have courses of action identified, they will not be the silver bullet that solves the regional escalations as the greater context alludes to, these territorial disputes have been going on since 1949 and are not likely to be dissuaded through more of the same escalate to de-escalate methodology anytime soon unless diplomatic efforts are exhausted, the default escalate to de-escalate military methodology is not as effective as our neocon purveyors would have us believe.  This is my opinion, and I am open to discussion, anyways, that will conclude part one of the PRC gray zone discussion.