NATO’s Eastern Flank Dilemma
NATO is in reaction mode again this week as yet more drone incursions have pierced into Polish airspace. This calls into question the true readiness of NATO in what has always been a contested region in and around the Suwalki Gap. After the September 10 strikes, several drone parts have recently been discovered in Eastern Poland near the border with Belarus – the village of Czosnowka has been named frequently. Czosnowka is a bit further South from Suwalki but still highlights the connection that Belarus has to the incursions, Belarus after all is part of the Union State compact established with Russia and often serves as a staging point or launching point for incursions.
Czosnowka sits just across the border in line with Brest, Belarus.
The largest concern that these incursions bring to light is NATO’s Eastern flank defense inadequacy. For years, NATO has claimed that its Eastern flank defense is highly capable of repelling any Russian advances. With respect to this claim, I would first ask if NATO has a clear ROE framework for drone incursions? Perhaps these types of incursions fall below the threshold of their hostile act trigger for a response? I would think that NATO and/or Poland would at a minimum have counter UAS options such as GPS jamming or directed energy technologies pre-positioned along the entire border with Belarus.
Another question I have is if these incursions are tied to the Zapad 2025 exercise, the Russia-Belarus joint exercise scenario which took place from 12-16 September 2025? If this is the case, this may suggest that Russia is testing the responses from NATO and Poland before their planned larger drills. These incursions could be the product of a larger evaluation campaign focused on air defense integration and response. These probing operations are likely evaluating NATO’s thresholds and decision cycle times, which appear to be inadequate. Even if the incursions were detected by Polish ISR platforms, the lack of data sharing and the lack of a joint response does call into question the viability of Eastern flank defense in its entirety.
How do NATO and allied partners respond? NATO is sending equipment to bolster defenses along the Polish-Belarus border, which is a good start but perhaps its time to do more in terms of operational rhythm and policy. The deterrence messaging is more important then ever as too weak a response may embolden the Russian MOD, Russia is expecting added defenses along the border, but what else can be done?. Another consideration is the matter of Article 5, it will be very important for NATO to demonstrate to the World that Article 5 commitments mean something, the World must see Poland receive immediate allied backing from NATO. One suggestion is for NATO to raise readiness levels to demonstrate cohesion and unity. Treating this as a Polish only problem is likely to embolden Moscow further and once again weakens NATO’s collective defense posture. NATO would be clearly messaging the World that this is a NATO problem and not just a Polish problem.
So what now?
Establish an immediate presence of force along the Polish - Belarus border, particularly in the region surrounding the Suwalki Gap. Scramble-capable fighter patrols, AWACS coverage, and naval air assets to deter further penetrations and reassure Allies, it’s as much about reassurance to allies as it is to deterrence at this point.
Deploy mobile counter-UAS kits (radar, RF jammers, kinetic interceptors, acoustic detectors) and critical infrastructure to the region surrounding the Suwalki Gap, thats what Russia cares most about - the Suwalki Gap.
Convene Article 4 consultations, issue a clear, unified NATO statement condemning violations and demanding transparency. Article 4 consultations have been requested by Poland. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones.
Task AWACS, national radars, commercial SATCOM SIGINT, and partner ISR to capture tracks.
Clarify ROE for UAS/drone engagements in allied airspace.
Publish NATO C-UAS doctrine, certify interoperable kits, and finance a shared pool of rapid-deploy systems.
