The Falkland Islands War_Part One
Background
For centuries prior to the start of this conflict, the South American nation of Argentina and the United Kingdom struggled over the sovereign entitlement to the Falkland Islands. Tensions between these two nations over these islands dates back to the 16th century and it is quite evident that many of these tensions have arisen out of deep seated cultural, and social misgivings.
Add to this, political instability, external influences and the dynamics of posturing at the height of the cold war and it is clear that the perfect storm had materialized to transform this largely insignificant island chain into a centerpiece for an Anglo-Argentine conflict. Amid serious internal strife, the Argentine Junta was desperate to regain public support as it had so clearly achieved during the Peron era. General Galtieri’s strategy was to re-unify the nation through the symbolic reclamation of the Islas Malvinas. A strategy that may have been productive in the short term but as will be discussed, a flawed long-term strategy for the leadership of his people. On the other end of the Atlantic, Britain received the news of the invasion of one of its last remaining colonies and went into action. With less fervor but no less nationalism, the Thatcher administration went to work in an effort to immediately examine its options. With the determination to forcefully defend the Falkland Islands, little room was left for negotiation(s). Some bold actions were taken by Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, actions which would define her as a strong leader of Britain as the re-invigoration of nationalism had awoken this dormant world empire.
While domestic influences seemed to drive both nations to war, there were external forces that similarly helped to precipitate this conflict. Argentina was concerned with its standing in South America, and as the premier South American nation, their concern was that in order to be respected as the leading force in South America they needed to establish once and for all their sovereignty over the Malvinas. General Galtieri recognized that more was needed than simple posturing and he led his nation to war on this premise. For Britain, the external influences to take action over the invasion were more significant. A well respected and principle member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been attacked and to do nothing in response at the height of the cold war would have amounted to far more than the physical loss of the Falkland Islands. Margaret Thatcher recognized the importance of making a firm stand in the
defense of these islands and did so with bold determination, she led her nation to war in a gamble that demonstrated her remarkable leadership.
Many mistakes and miscalculations can be attributed to both sides of the leadership in the lead up to this conflict, during the conflict and after the resultant British victory. In this context I mean the leadership to encompass the policy-makers, the intelligence analysts and the military commanders at least in the strategic sense. An intelligence failure is often attributed to being a political failure as well, and Britain, despite its victory in this conflict certainly had its share of mistakes in the handling of the Falklands’ invasion. It seems that Britain had been largely uncommitted to finding a long term solution to the sovereignty of the Falklands and had also failed to take the Argentinean’ claims seriously. This helped to shape an attitude of complacency among the leadership, the military, and the people of Britain which in itself has been the most significant strategic error in that Britain failed to perceive Argentina as a real threat. Needless to say, as in most conflicts, a great many lessons were learned in the months, years, and even decades following this conflict. Political; domestic and external military; tactical and strategic, and the always useful production of timely intelligence. Lessons were learned as part of the geopolitical landscape is concerned in the tense cold war environment of the early 1980s. All of these lessons are still being learned today and serve as a reminder of the volatility of sudden and unannounced warfare.
As previously stated, claims for the sovereign entitlement to the Falkland Islands dates back to the 16th century when landings occurred by British, French and Spanish explorers. No officially recognized claims were made and in the years and decades following, the islands were not much more than a minor point of interest, and/or stopping off point. In the 18th century, with the advent of long distance ocean going vessels, the islands became more important as they were now seen as having significant strategic value. In 1833, Britain seized control of the islands in the first real effort to maintain a continuous and active settlement. Britain has successfully done just that, they have maintained the Falklands as a colony varying in population since this original force was deployed in 1833 to take control of the island chain. This has been the major argument in support of the British sovereign claim to the Falklands, the continuous occupation of the islands by its settlers. The settlers have always maintained their nationalism to be closely associated with that of Britain as it is Britain that is claimed by the Falklanders as their parent country or fatherland. The self-determination of the Falklanders to maintain their island as an inherent part of the United Kingdom has been the driving force that has mitigated serious incursions by the Argentines between 1833 and 1982. (Arquilla, 2009)
The Argentine claim to the islands is based upon Spanish conquest and demarcation lines established by the Catholic church hundreds of years before any British settlement was established. As the Spanish Empire eventually passed regional rights of claim to the Argentines and their drafting of a constitution took place in 1853, the islands became the official sovereign territory of Argentina, at least according to the Catholic church. (Tulchin, 2009)
In the 20th century, a relationship was established between Britain and Argentina with the intent of establishing some common ground regarding the permanent disposition of the islands. In the 1960s, however, the relationship became quite strained when the United Nations enacted resolution 1514 which called for an end to colonialism. The Falklands had been officially listed as a colony of the United Kingdom and as such, the Argentines objected to the continued occupation by British origin islanders and began a campaign to enforce both the old papal claim as well as the new UN resolution. In 1971, after secret talks between the British and Argentine governments, an agreement known as the communications agreement was signed and put into effect. This agreement established direct links between the islands and the Argentine mainland to facilitate expedited air and sea shipments.
Provisions to the agreement included the issuing of Argentine identity cards to islanders and postal and phone services provided by Buenos Aires agencies. The underlying message was that the islands were to be reliant on Argentina for its support which only exacerbated tensions, especially among the islanders. In 1975 the British government became interested in the economic potential of the Falklands and mandated that an economic survey of the islands be conducted. Lord Edward Shackleton, the son of the famous Antarctic explorer, was assigned the task of conducting the survey. The task was not easily accomplished as Argentina objected furiously over the mandate and refused travel to the islands via Argentina.
As a remedy, Lord Shackleton was transported aboard the Royal Research Ship (RRS) Shackleton to the islands and before arriving, the ship was fired upon by the Argentine destroyer Almirante Storni. The report was finally delivered in 1977 and was said to have claimed that significant economic potential existed on and around the islands to include the possibility of oil deposits under the islands. (Calvert, 2009) In 1976, the domestic political situation changed dramatically for Argentina when a military Junta took control of the government.
Road To Crisis
A shift in tactics and policies were evident as Argentina stepped up its military presence around the Falklands which included the establishment of a covert military base on Southern Thule.
The UK countered with diplomatic protest and temporarily stepped up its naval presence in the region.
The dynamic of the relationship between Britain and Argentina had now become more delicate as tensions rose yet again. The buildup to war is mostly one-sided in that Argentina invaded the Falklands unprovoked, a long look at Argentina in the years preceding the conflict is the most beneficial method for any examination of the buildup to armed conflict between Argentina and Britain. An aggressive pro-national culture existed in post-World War II Argentina with the election of President Juan Peron in 1946. Together with his wife, Eva they inspired their nation to become proud and nationalistic. The Peron’s became fanatical in their approach to governance and by the mid-1950s were removed from office in a coup de etat. Yet, this culture of strong nationalism survived and carried over throughout the multiple regime changes that plagued this country during the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Peron returned to power for a brief period in the early 1970s through an intermediary and was even re-elected to the Presidency again in 1973 though short lived. Peron died in 1974 and his wife assumed the Presidency though her administration was short lived as well due to economic ruin and deteriorating support.
What the Perons’ return to office did do was to re-invigorate the ideology of Peronism and restore the strong culture of nationalism to the nation’s growing population of youth. A military Junta seized control of the Argentine government in 1976 and tightened its grip on the people of Argentina by regulating nearly everything. An escalation in tensions between the Junta and the people of Argentina led to organized revolts and the formation of groups whose sole purpose was to undermine the Junta. The revolts often became violent and an insurgency developed at the height of what is known to Argentines as the Dirty War. By the early 1980s, the Junta realized that their situation was critical and at least 1,500 lives had been taken as a result of the Dirty War. In December 1981, General Leopoldo Galtieri was appointed as the new leader of the Junta and President of Argentina. His mission was to bring about change to Argentina by re-unifying the government and its people as the Perons had done so successfully. His strategy was to reclaim the lost Malvinas and restore nationalism through the defeat of an external opponent. The initial invasion of the Falklands occurred only a few months after his assumption of office. In the days and weeks following the initial invasion, the public rallied behind Galtieri and the Junta, his strategy was very successful as a unified Argentina had now come together to defeat the Anglo empire and retake the Malvinas once and for all. General Galtieri was now officially President Galtieri in the people’s eyes, it was perceived that a true leader of the people had finally re-emerged, or were the people mistaken?
So, this was the perfect opportunity for Galtieri, the Junta and even the people to demonstrate the strength of their unification under a common ideology, this colonialism would end and now was the time.
Argentina Invades
Early on April 02nd 1982 Argentine forces conducted an amphibious assault on the East Falkland Island’s main settlement of Port Stanley. Within hours, the Argentine forces completely overwhelmed the small garrison of Royal Marines assigned to the only significantly populated town in the Falklands. The British Governor, Sir Rex Hunt surrendered Port Stanley to Argentina’s military forces immediately signaling the Argentine’s commitment to their reclamation goals. Within hours of the invasion, an amateur radio transmission was exchanged between the Falklands and Britain to alert London of the attack. After confirmation was received, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took to action in the draft of a military counterattack. On April 03rd 1982 an emergency session of the British Parliament was held during which Prime Minister Thatcher announced the dispatch of a Task Force to the Falklands and subsequent launch of Operation Corporate. The announcement was well received by nearly all members of the Parliament and Michael Foot of the Labour Party remarked that it was “Britain’s moral duty” to defend the Falklands. On 05 April 1982, only 72 hours after the initial invasion of the Falklands, the British Task Force was launched from Portsmouth Harbor. The Task Force was robust; it consisted of Britain’s two premier aircraft carriers, the HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, three nuclear submarines, the HMS Spartan, HMS Splendid, and HMS Conqueror, and several frigates. A group of destroyers and missile cruisers which were already enroute were re-assigned from mid-Atlantic maneuvers to join the task force. A civilian fleet of approximately 50 ships followed the Task Force and included the hospital ship, the Uganda.
An exclusion zone of 200 miles around the Falklands was declared by Britain and enforced by the Task Force immediately upon arrival.
While the task force was enroute, Britain’s Prime Minister and Parliament wasted no time in affirming Britain’s position to the international community. Britain imposed sanctions upon Argentina and was backed by the European Economic Community, (the predecessor to today’s European Union). The United Nations unofficially backed Britain in its counterattack, though no official consent was offered besides the passing of UN resolution 502, which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities by both Argentina and Britain. Negotiation attempts were facilitated through the United States Secretary of State Haig and were not productive, even in the least. Britain remained firm in its position that Argentina immediately withdraw and comply with the recently imposed exclusion zone. Prime Minister Thatcher’s response to the invasion was swift, and resolute in nature as she remained unwavering in her convictions throughout this conflict with Argentina. The people of the UK rallied behind PM Thatcher and much like Argentina, Britain had reclaimed its sense of nationalism as the former empire was once again in defense of its honor.
It took the British Task Force three weeks to sail from the UK to the Falkland Islands and they soon realized the logistical nightmare that an 8,000 mile distance would create. The Argentine forces were challenged in a different way, their largely untrained forces were mostly conscripts and were no match for the well trained British Soldiers, Royal Marines, Paratroopers and Special Forces of the SAS or Special Air Service. I would argue that the only reason that the British forces did not defeat Argentine forces more decisively was due to the fact they were significantly outnumbered with ground forces. The professionally trained British forces and the tactics that they employed were exemplified by the British SAS as they provided excellent intelligence to the Task Force main element commanders. They reconnoitered virtually every aspect of the Argentine forces’ occupation and further initiated contact ahead of the main element. They successfully facilitated the recapture of South Georgia Island with the Royal Marines and sabotaged eight or more Argentine aircraft during an early morning raid back on the East Falkland Island.
The Land Campaign
By late April the Task Force had arrived and on April 25th, a strike force retook South Georgia island with no difficulty and little resistance. The rest of the Falkland islands group were not so easily taken. The land campaign overall was difficult for British forces due to the fact that British Paratroopers from the 2nd Para and Royal Marines had to ruck across rugged terrain to reach their objective(s). With Port Stanley as their objective, British commanders decided to distance their infil to protect British civilians and reduce casualties. It was good logic to draw Argentine forces out and away from Stanley, but all of this would degrade the fitness and readiness of British troops when it came time to fight. British forces landed in a small natural bay named San Carlos located on the West side of East Falkland, they were met with no resistance. That fact alone, was an indirect signal to British commanders that their superior tactics and planning would be the advantage that they needed. The British infantry and Royal Marines marched south to retake the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green where they did meet significant resistance. They were still able to retake these settlements within a couple of days with some maneuvering and shifting of forces, it was becoming apparent that even at the platoon and squad level, British forces were a far superior fighting force. British forces then moved Eastward across no man’s land towards Stanley to seize the high ground overlooking Port Stanley.
Once the 2nd Para had seized the high ground overlooking Stanley and all of the other settlements West of Stanley, it was becoming quite apparent that victory was imminent. With British forces now surrounding and blockading Stanley, the Argentine commander of ground forces; General Mario Menendez was left with no alternative but to surrender and he did on June 14, 1982.
While there were certainly some significant air and sea battles, the land campaign was the main effort with the re-seizure of the capital town of Stanley as the fundamental decisive action of the land campaign and of the war. General Menendez' surrender on June 14 effectively ended the war. British forces captured 11,400 Argentine prisoners throughout the war, most in Stanley, all of which were hungry, out of ammunition and completely demoralized. The conscripting methodology was a disaster for Argentine forces.
Air, Sea and the Exocet
The air and sea battles were not nearly as decisive or one sided due to the skill and tenacity of Argentine fighter/bomber pilots. The Argentine air force used the dated A-4 Skyhawk, but it was still fast, maneuverable and armed with the best anti-ship missile in the world; the French Exocet.
Argentine pilots flew below radar and often dangerously skimmed just above sea level to be perfectly positioned to launch the Exocets. They were successful…a lot. One of their most important victories was the sinking of the SS Atlantic Conveyor, this ship was a logistics vessel that carried critical supplies and six Chinook troop carrier helicopters to be used by British forces in the land campaign. Without these helicopters, British land forces would now have to traverse all of this difficult terrain by foot. The loss of other critical supplies further strained all elements of the task force as any resupply effort would take 2-3 weeks to arrive. Argentine pilots knew where to strike and how to fully leverage the high performing Exocet missile to equal the playing field. British Naval Commanders underestimated Argentine Air Force capability in this regard.
By early May, air strikes and strafing runs by Argentine fighters were common. They were limited though, in that they had no existing airbase since Stanley’s airstrip would not accommodate the fighters, they had to launch from Argentina and fly 300 miles to the arrive at the exclusion zone. By the end of this conflict, the Argentine Air Force had sunk six British ships and one landing craft utility (LCU) craft.
The Argentine Army was ill prepared for taking on a major international power and lacked the strategic experience to enter the international arena. The Junta and Argentine Army decided to fill critical gaps in ground forces with the forced draft of conscripts. Conscripts have rarely produced favorable results or fulfilled gaps as capable warfighters and this war was no different. The conscripts were poorly trained, issued substandard equipment/resources and rushed into a foreign environment very quickly. In the end, their insubordinate behavior, poor morale and incompetence were more of a detriment to leaders than an asset.
Initially, the conscripts did serve a valued purpose in augmenting the amphibious assault team that invaded the capital town of Stanley. Their foothold of the capital town throughout the war was maintained largely in part due to the high numbers of troops on the ground there, which were primarily conscripts. This was the only reason that they held on as long as they did, in my opinion. Had lower level leaders organized a more concerted effort to have these conscripts thoroughly trained prior to the conduct of the invasion, perhaps this would not have been as much an issue, particularly in the latter stages of the conflict when morale and discipline became a significant factor.
The Argentine ground and maritime commanders deployed the Amphibious Commandos Group to be the spearhead of the initial invasion force that took Port Stanley. This group is the equivalent of a Special Forces organization trained to quickly seize objectives. They were obviously a crucial part of the larger amphibious invasion force with the conscripts and their deployment was one of the few successfully planned assaults of the war.
The Argentine Navy and Air Force saw more success throughout the course of the conflict as their air and sea operations were conducted. Their successes were due at least in part to the professionalism of their forces and the level of technical expertise requisite in their professions. It seems that there was a slightly more cohesive relationship among these branches due to this dynamic. The fact that air raids and sorties were conducted with the frequency that they were is a testament to the planning and leadership that was put forth. This due to the great distances involved between Argentine air bases on the mainland and the Malvinas. The Fuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA) only had two air tankers in its inventory and many of its jet fighters did not even have the capability for in-flight air refueling. Still, the FAA did do a fair share of enemy engagement in the air, on the ground and at sea. Their close air support to Argentine ground forces and the bombing runs, though brief, were a significant part of their campaign to repel the British counterattack. Eventually, the constraints of distance and an aging wing of aircraft got the best of them and they were outdone by the Royal Navy. Nevertheless, their adaptability and flexibility is indicative of strong leadership and the credit would go to the mid-level leadership, such as the air combatant commanders and the junior planners within the Junta itself.
The Argentine Navy or Armada of the Argentine Republic (ARA) supported the invasion of the Malvinas primarily by providing transport to the land forces and by providing critical aviation support to the FAA. The traditional surface naval battles of WWII were a thing of the past, the ARA had aviation assets that could reach out and touch opposition forces with high tech missile systems, such as the Exocet, as previously discussed. They scored a major victory early on with the Exocets being launched from two of the ARA’s Super Etendard jet aircraft. One of the missiles struck the Royal Navy’s HMS Sheffield midship, sinking the frigate and killing 20 of its crew members. Also, as discussed in installment #2, on 25 May, 1982, two land based Exocets launched from a mobile launcher struck the MV Atlantic Conveyor, a civilian container ship that had just arrived to re-supply the British Task Force. The Exocets sunk the 15,000 ton merchant ship and had left British ground forces in a predicament. The use of a single missile system by the ARA completely caught the Royal Navy off guard and forced them to completely re-strategize their maritime operations. This also forced a complete change in ground strategy by the British 2nd Para and their mission to retake Stanley from San Carlos.
The Exocet is an anti-ship missile that skims the surface of the water in order to reduce its signature and strike its target with little or no warning. Even in the 1980s, the Exocet was on the cutting edge of missile and guidance technology, so its acquisition and use by Argentina had significant tactical and strategic significance in this conflict. It is possible that Argentina acquired the Exocets with the foresight that they would be needed in the conquest of the Malvinas, but not likely, in my opinion. They had previously acquired much of their aviation assets and hardware from France, where the Exocet was produced. It seems more likely to me that they acquired these anti-ship missiles as part of a larger multi contract deal involving aircraft purchases, such as the Super Etendard or Mirage series aircraft. Their history of conflict was with Chile, with whom they share a 3,000 mile land border, why would they be buying anti-ship missiles in bulk where the vast majority of fighting would be land based? Given the Junta’s history of poor strategizing, it is my opinion that the acquisition of the Exocets was a planning fluke that worked in their favor.
Argentine Leadership
My overall assessment of Argentine leadership in this conflict is that President Galtieri did not do well; short term solutions are not leadership, they are management, and manage a brewing internal crisis is all that he did with his hasty invasion of the Malvinas. At the time, I’m sure that he was perceived as a brilliant leader in that he had re-unified the country in a few short months, but this is not the case. What he in fact had done was further discredit the Junta, create another combatant enemy for Argentina, damage Argentina’s standing with the United States and in the international community, cost hundreds of Argentine conscript citizens their lives and contribute to the growing national debt. He lacked the vision to actually lead Argentina towards a long term solution, one that would resolve its internal conflict and end the Dirty War. Focus on long term resolution of the growing economic problems and resolution of the insurgency was what he should have had as top priorities. Instead, what he did was to engage in a game of diversion as he led his country to war, which really only exacerbated these problems that were placed on the back burner.
Argentina’s mid-level leadership did better than their President and the Junta as they acted upon their orders in the conduct of this war with Britain. Their tactical prowess was evident in the aggressive manner in which they engaged British forces on land, at sea and in the air. They clearly understood their mission and did the best that they could despite the fact that their troops were mainly conscripts, and their fleet and aircraft were aged and in disrepair. They may or may not have had the knowledge that this war over the Malvinas was primarily to be a diversion, but they conducted it as if the conquest of the Malvinas was to be a long term objective and committed their forces accordingly. Ultimately, poor planning, severely undertrained ground forces and critical underestimations of British forces saw to their demise. They should not be blamed for the loss of this war with Britain though, this was unavoidable strategic blundering on the part of Galtieri and the Junta. In the final days of the land war, particularly in and around Port Stanley, morale and discipline among the conscript soldiers became such that order could not be maintained. This is indicative of a major lack of leadership and the mid-level leadership should have taken note that this growing concern be addressed. If conscripts were to be used, then they should have been trained properly and reinforced with seasoned soldiers and non-commissioned officers among the force accordingly. All of this mixed with a couple of tactical successes and some well-planned Exocet strikes make for a mediocre mid-level assessment of performance in this conflict.
British Leadership
My assessment of Britain’s response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands will begin with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. PM Thatcher did have prior intelligence that Argentine forces were re-aligning to Southern areas of Argentina. She knew on 19 March, 1982 that an invasion of South Georgia Island had occurred and that an invasion of East Falkland Island and Port Stanley was imminent. Despite having this intelligence, PM Thatcher still only had a very narrow window to work within and was forced to make critical and timely decisions to lead her nation in its response. Very little diplomacy was conducted by PM Thatcher and her cabinet, most of these efforts were being conducted by the United States Secretary of State; Alexander Haig. Her participation in any diplomacy was that of a token effort as she had already determined the course of action for her nation. The initial preparations for a military response had already begun prior to the main invasion of the Falklands on 02 April, 1982. She acted without hesitation and was very firm in her conviction to immediately show Argentina and the world that Britain would not allow for an invasion of its sovereign territory to occur. Another very important component of PM Thatcher’s decision to take action was that of Britain’s role as a senior member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the height of the cold war. The cold war was all about posturing, and this was a rare opportunity to posture militarily and show the Warsaw Pact and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republic (USSR) that NATO and Britain were not paper tigers. Yet another component of her decision to take action was that of internal implications; to take an action that would best represent the British people. She had not been a particularly popular Prime Minister, more than likely a victim of circumstance due to the recession of the early 1980s and some unpopular economic initiatives. Here was an opportunity for her to restore her approval rating and perhaps restore British nationalism at the same time. With all of this weighing on her in the decision making process, she proceeded in a steadfast manner that set her apart as an exceptional leader as there were inherent risks, and big ones.
Britain was largely unprepared for a military conflict in that it had internal issues of its own, not to mention the fact that it’s military was under budget constraints and in the early stages of a force re-structuring. The recession had driven both inflation and unemployment to unprecedented highs and Britain had its own version of an insurgency in Northern Ireland with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). With a full plate in front of her already, PM Thatcher proceeded with Operation Corporate in the reclamation of the Falklands, a bold move for any leader.
It is noteworthy how Britain paralleled Argentina in terms of internal strife and how both PM Thatcher and President Galtieri had apparently made leadership decisions largely based on their internal situations. I would submit however that the situation in Argentina was far direr and President Galtieri’s decision may have been based entirely on resolving internal crises whereas PM Thatcher’s decisions were not. PM Thatcher’s decision making, while based partly on restoring her credibility was far cleaner and genuine in intent I believe. According to many of her proponents, she genuinely wanted to see to the long term resolution of this issue that had been a thorn in Britain’s side for decades and of a lesser degree since 1833.
PM Thatcher brilliantly earned support from the international community and the backing of the United Nations, to some extent. She was leading her country in the defense of a territory which was claimed by Britain in 1833 and continually inhabited by Britons since 1833. This lent significant credibility to her cause and PM Thatcher brilliantly established this before engaging in military action. With the passing of UN Resolution 502, she had even greater credibility. So when the Argentines refused to withdraw their forces and cease hostilities, she proclaimed a 200 mile exclusion zone around the Falklands to formalize the breach committed by Argentina.
Meanwhile, Britain’s military leaders were faced with the enormous challenge of coordinating a task force during a military drawdown and consolidating this task force’s efforts to a counterattack that was to take place 8,000 miles from home. Some planning had taken place prior to the formal announcement of PM Thatcher’s authorization to conduct Operation Corporate, but the difficult hard details of this operation were planned and executed literally within hours of this official announcement. The professionalism and legacy of excellent leadership inherent in the British military was being put to the test and they rose to the challenge in exactly the manner expected of a professional military force. Amid a major restructuring effort already taking place within the Royal Navy, its senior leaders mobilized the bulk of its fleet within hours of the Prime Minister’s announcement. Coordination had been made to use Ascension Island as a strategic assembly area for the task force and excellent joint operations were conducted there between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force to conduct the timely launch of Operation Corporate. The strategic actions taken were completely appropriate with the immediate launch of submarines to the islands and the dispatch of its two aircraft carriers to Ascension Island. There the task force would completely assemble and move forward to begin the conduct of Operation Corporate. First and foremost, the defense of further incursions into the 200 mile exclusion zone were to be conducted, then the counterattack launched upon East Falkland Island would include the land force elements from the Royal Marines and 2nd Para.
British Logistics
As previously stated, the logistical challenges were significant and complex to say the least, these challenges were worked through with relative ease in the initial deployment of the task force. This must be credited to the great leadership among the senior levels of the British military. Joint service coordination with complexities of this magnitude would have required enormous resource management and guidance at all levels of this deployment. After the task force arrived in the theater of operations, long term sustainment did not go as well. Insufficient supply chain resources brought about significant challenges for task force commanders, planners and the Soldiers, Marines, Airmen and Sailors of the Task Force. The supply chains that were established were entirely dependent upon maritime transport vessels from the merchant fleet, this was an insufficient long term strategy. Obviously, Buenos Aires was no longer a viable method for routing shipments and there were no airports to utilize, even the Argentine controlled airstrip at Port Stanley was far too small to accommodate any kind of transport aircraft. The magnitude of this logistics shortcoming was fully realized when the MV Atlantic Conveyor was sunk and the land forces were forced to do without a vital re-supply soon before the major land campaign started. Resilient commanders of the Royal Marines and the 2nd Para adapted new strategies and the land campaign had taken on a new meaning. Aboard the Atlantic Conveyor were the Chinook Helicopters that were to transport the main body of the assault force to the outskirts of Port Stanley. The new plan was to walk the 50 miles from San Carlos Bay, where the forces landed, to the opposite side of East Falkland. The terrain was rough and the weather harsh, but the excellent training of the British forces made the plan a viable option for commanders. The 2nd Para and the Commando element of the British Army had trained extensively in the arctic climate of Norway where they had received mountaineering training. Another testament to the professional fighting force that is the British Royal Forces, their leadership had the flexibility to push their troops in a desperate situation.
A tactical planning error was made along the way to Port Stanley when the 2nd Para diverted from its path to Port Stanley to seize the tiny village of Goose Green. The paratroopers encountered heavy resistance there as they were outnumbered four to one. After hours of intense fighting, Goose Green was taken from the Argentines, but at the cost of 17 paratroopers and a senior commander; LTC H. Jones. This noteworthy engagement was one of the few miscalculations made during the ground campaign by commanders, and despite the casualties, the objective was still achieved.
Part One Final Thoughts
Lessons were learned from this engagement and immediately applied to battlefield strategy as British combatant commanders exercised greater tactical patience from that point forward. They leap frogged from point to point seizing high ground as they approached their final objective; Port Stanley. They had an established battle rhythm by the time they had reached the high ground just outside Port Stanley and this is where their war of attrition had finally done the Argentines in. Argentine leadership had all but abandoned their conscript soldiers to defend the front line on the outskirts of Port Stanley with little if no guidance. After a few well-placed volleys of shots from British forces, chaos ensued and the conscripts retreated into town.
The success of British forces in the land campaign was a testament to the superior leadership inherent in their forces at virtually all levels. The British were at a distinct disadvantage in terms of numbers of ground forces, critical resources and even by tactical position, yet they managed to reach their objectives in a little over one month.
The sea and air campaigns did have some serious setbacks but went well overall as their leaders also exercised great flexibility. The Royal Navy established its important role early on in the conflict when one of its submarines sunk the Argentine cruiser, the ARA Belgrano. Only days later did the Argentines strike back when the HMS Sheffield was sunk by an Exocet missile. This caused the Royal Navy to re-assess its early detection systems and not only changed the course of their response in this conflict but paved the way for a systemic overhaul in its hardware and defensive stratagem. With resources stretched thin, some brilliant tacticians made the best of its new vertical takeoff and landing capable Sea Harrier aircraft. While subsonic, the Harrier dual role aircraft still played a critical part in the air campaign and confirmed their useful role in maritime aviation. They capitalized on the fact that there were no airstrips sufficient to accommodate Argentine fighters and with only two KC-135 type refueling aircraft, Argentine fighters would have to travel 300 miles each way. British combatant commanders used the Sea Harriers VTOL capability to their advantage and seized opportunities to expose this weakness of the FAA and ARA. Minimal air to air engagements actually took place as this was built in to the strategy of British commanders, they determined when and where engagements were to take place. Air supremacy was never achieved but air superiority was and this was due largely in part to superior strategy in the British control of airspace. The RAF conducted air raids from as far away as Ascension Island and were partially successful but more importantly demonstrated the enormous capability and resourcefulness of the RAF. Another testament to British leadership was the superiority achieved over the ARA and FAA despite numerical superiority and geographical advantage in the theater of operations.
At the national level, the Prime Minister and top British leaders rallied the British people as an inspirational victory was achieved by the task force. British nationalism was a pleasant by-product of the victory over the Falklands whereas in Argentina, nationalism was the product. PM Thatcher didn’t exploit nationalism as President Galtieri and the Junta did, she did use it to further facilitate her goals, a common political tactic that is not inappropriate. While it is still possible that PM Thatcher had ulterior motives for her swift military counterattack I would suggest that her primary reasoning was that of genuine regard for the safety and security of the islanders who claimed British allegiance. Other factors probably accelerated her decision making process, factors previously discussed, but my bottom-line assessment of her performance as a leader during this conflict holds in her high regard. She made critical decisions in a tight window based on all available intelligence and had contingencies drafted to suit the best available course of action. Whether right or wrong, she made hard decisions quickly and saw them through, this is leadership.
From the senior military command at the Ministry of Defense down to the combatant commanders within the Royal Armed Services, all exhibited great leadership in the conduct of Operation Corporate. This driven home by the fact that they had great adversities to deal with and had managed to overcome these adversities in a relatively short amount of time. The economy had forced the Ministry of Defense to significantly reduce its naval inventory and restructure its other branches to best manage expenses. The mobilization and deployment for this conflict occurred in complete accordance with Parliament instructions and all previously established timelines were met. The previously discussed logistical barriers were enormous and complex, yet these barriers were overcome while simultaneously conducting a land, sea and air campaign. A close partnership seemed to exist between all branches of the Royal Service, evident in the seamless manner in which they conducted operations together throughout this conflict.
